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Abstract 
In two recent papers, Rose and Nichols present evidence in favor of the view that hu-
mans represent category essences in terms of a telos, such as honey-making, and not 
in terms of scientific essences, such as bee DNA. In this paper, I challenge their inter-
pretation of the evidence, and show that it is directly predicted by the main theory they 
seek to undermine. I argue that their results can be explained as instances of diagnostic 
reasoning about scientific essences. 
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1. Introduction 
According to psychological essentialism, we represent a host of categories as having 
an underlying, unobservable essence that gives rise to the observable traits and behav-
ior of category members. The most prominent version of psychological essentialism is 
placeholder essentialism (Gelman, 2004; Medin & Ortony, 1989). According to place-
holder essentialism, when we essentialize a category, we do not have to know what 
exactly the essence in question is—we just have to represent the category as having an 
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essence, whatever it turns out to be (Gelman, 2004; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Rips, 2011). 
If we acquire the relevant knowledge—say, in the process of formal education—we can 
elaborate the ‘placeholder’ and replace it with what we take to be the actual essence. 
A common view is that the placeholder gets elaborated in terms of what is, according 
to science, causally responsible for the outward features of a category. For example, 
when we gain the relevant scientific knowledge, we replace the essence placeholder of 
our water concept with H₂O. The reason for this is straightforward: according to psy-
chological essentialism, the essence is the cause of category members’ observable fea-
tures, and it is often science that tells us what exactly such causes are. 
Rose and Nichols (2019, 2020) call this hypothesis about how the essence of a cat-
egory gets elaborated ‘scientific essentialism’ (henceforth: SEH). They reject scientific 
essentialism, and instead defend the hypothesis of teleological essentialism (hence-
forth: TEH). According to TEH, humans elaborate essences in terms of an Aristotelian 
telos: the function or purpose of a thing which, by hypothesis, defines a category.1 Lions 
are for going to the zoo, clouds are for raining, mountains exist to give animals a place 
to climb. Rose and Nichols (henceforth: R&N) present various studies, most of which 
use variations of classic paradigms from the essentialism literature, that, in their view, 
strongly support TEH. On the basis of their findings they conclude “that people operate 
with a teleological view of essences” (2019, p. 14).  
My aim is to argue that the data R&N present do not favor TEH over SEH. To the 
contrary, their findings are straightforwardly predicted by SEH. If humans represent cat-
egories as structured according to SEH, basic principles of diagnostic reasoning predict 
 
1 Rose and Nichols also classify telos as an object’s ultimate cause, but insofar as this cause is, 
simultaneously, its goal, end, or purpose, all of which refer to effects, I take the locution of ‘cause’ 
in ‘ultimate cause’ to be metaphorical.  
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that they should follow precisely the inference patterns R&N report. My focus is on their 
2019 paper, but the points extend to their 2020 paper. 
2. The Data 
R&N present participants with different variations of classic essentialism paradigms 
such as Keil’s transformation paradigm (Keil, 1989) and systematically manipulate the 
telos (i.e., by hypothesis, the essence) of the object in question. For example, for bees, 
the manipulated telos is make honey or pollinate flowers. For spiders, the telos spin 
webs or catch insects is changed in the critical conditions.2 The reasoning is that if telos 
affects participants’ category judgements, we have evidence that participants represent 
essence in terms of telos (cf. Rose and Nichols, 2019, p. 3). I’ll briefly describe the first 
experiment of R&N’s 2019 paper to illustrate their main strategy.  
In experiment 1, participants were presented with a vignette describing scientists 
that perform superficial operations on animals. For example, participants were told that 
scientists performed an operation in which they removed a bee’s antenna, wings, 
changed the number and length of its legs, and so on. The participants also saw a pic-
ture of a bee representing the animal before the operation (fig. 1a), and a picture of a 
spider-looking animal representing the animal after the transformation (fig. 1b). 
 
2 The telos of objects had previously been determined in a pre-study, in which participants were 




Figure 1a. Picture presented to partici-
pants in experiment 1 in Rose and Nich-
ols (2019) of the bee before the opera-
tion. 
  
Figure 1b. Picture presented to partici-
pants in experiment 1 in Rose and Nich-
ols (2019) of the animal after the opera-
tion. 
Next, depending on the condition, the participants were given the following infor-
mation about the telos of the animal: 
Telos changed: After running some tests, they found that the thing after the 
special operation didn’t pollinate flowers or make honey. Instead, it only spun 
webs to catch insects and eat them.  
Telos preserved: After running some tests, they found that the thing after the 
special operation didn’t spin webs to catch insects and eat them. Instead, it only 
pollinated flowers and made honey. 
Thus, one group of participants learned that the telos has changed, and the other group 
learned that it stayed the same. R&N found that, when the bee was transformed to look 
like a spider, participants judged that the animal is a spider when the telos was spinning 
(= telos change), but was judged to be a bee when the thing was still pollinating flowers 
(= telos preserved). R&N interpret these results as supporting TEH over SEH.  
5 
3. Against Teleological Essentialism 
In this section, I challenge R&N’s interpretation of the evidence. I first give a brief over-
view of diagnostic reasoning, and then show that their results are predicted behaviors 
under SEH in diagnostic reasoning tasks. 
3.1 Diagnostic Reasoning 
The observable features of an object provide us with important evidence about its un-
observable properties. Diagnostic reasoning is our ability to make “inferences from ob-
served effects to (as yet) unobserved causes of these effects” (Meder & Mayrhofer, 
2017, p. 433). The ability to infer unobservable properties based on observable ones is 
indispensable and ubiquitous in everyday categorization tasks.  
If a concept is causally structured, the principles we use to make diagnostic infer-
ences about the unobservable properties of an object given its observable ones should 
be guided by the causal relations represented in the concept. According to SEH, natu-
ral kind concepts have a causal structure: the unobservable ‘placeholder’ or scientific 
essence causally generates the superficial perceptual properties of natural kind mem-
bers. Observing effect features should then allow people to diagnostically infer the 
cause: the underlying scientific essence. And since the scientific essence is usually con-
strued as necessary and sufficient for category membership, humans can infer category 
membership from the essence.  
There is a large body of evidence that we indeed do reason diagnostically in the 
way predicted by SEH (e.g., Fernbach, Darlow, & Sloman, 2011; Kim & Ahn, 2002; Kim 
& Keil, 2003; Oppenheimer, Tenenbaum, & Krynski, 2013; Rehder, 2010; Rehder & Kim, 
2009; see also Meder & Mayrhofer, 2017; Rehder, 2017 for overviews). For example, 
using a transformation paradigm, Hampton, Estes, and Simmons (2007) asked subjects 
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whether, for example, a bird that looks exactly like an insect due to exposure to hazard-
ous chemicals has changed category membership. While more subjects judged the an-
imal to still be a bird, a large minority judged it to have changed category membership 
to an insect. Importantly, they found that subjects’ answers depended on what they in-
ferred about the animal’s underlying causal structures. The justifications members of 
the second group provided made clear that they didn’t judge on the basis of appear-
ance. Instead, many used the change in effect features as evidence to diagnostically 
infer changes in deeper cause features: “participants reasoned that because both the 
behavior and the appearance had changed, there must be a new set of causal princi-
ples acting within the creature” (Hampton et al., 2007, p. 1790). For example, when 
subjects reasoned about a giraffe, the fact that not only their appearance, but also their 
behavior changed made participants infer changes in “deep causal processes within 
the animal’s nervous system” (Hampton et al., 2007, p. 1791). The internal changes, in 
turn, signaled a change in category membership (to a camel). In contrast, subjects who 
judged that the animal didn’t change its category appealed to the fact that it produced 
offspring from its original category, and inferred, from this, the absence of internal 
changes (e.g., to the animal DNA). Hence both groups used observable features to di-
agnostically infer the state of essentialist causal-scientific structures and determined 
category membership on that basis.  
In fact, the classical studies by Keil (1989) are also an excellent example of diagnos-
tic reasoning based on SEH. SEH predicts that under normal conditions, observable 
effect features give us diagnostic evidence for their underlying causes. However, when 
we know that the effect features have been generated by external background causes, 
and not the causal essence, the inference from effect features to underlying causal es-
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sences is defeated. Hence, effects that normally provide evidence for underlying fea-
tures can be “explained away”— a hallmark of diagnostic reasoning—by external manip-
ulations, which is exactly what Keil found.3  
Notice a crucial difference between Keil’s study and the one by Hampton and col-
leagues. In Keil’s study, subjects were told that the observable features were externally 
manipulated. In contrast, Hampton’s study did not involve an explicit manipulation of 
observable features: all changes were the product of some sort of mutation. Thus, the 
possibility remained that the changes were due to a change in internal aspects of the 
category members elicited by the mutation.  
3.2 Diagnostic Reasoning and Teleological Essentialism 
Let us apply our insights from the last section concerning diagnostic reasoning about 
scientific essences to R&N’s (2019) findings. Throughout the experiments, participants 
are told that animals undergo some sort of transformation that goes so far as to change 
animals’ normal behavior. SEH predicts that participants can take this as diagnostic evi-
dence that the scientific essence has, too, undergone a transformation during the sur-
gery. Since numerous effect features that are normally caused by a bee-essence are not 
present anymore, participants reason that the underlying scientific essence must have 
been changed too. 
The results in R&N’s experiment 1 are straightforwardly predicted by SEH. Recall 
that participants were presented with a bee that underwent an operation making it look 
just like a spider. In the critical conditions, the animal either maintained or changed its 
 
3  See also Oppenheimer, Tenenbaum, & Krynski (2013) for a direct investigation of 
discounting and augmenting in diagnostic reasoning. 
8 
telos. The authors found that the telos manipulation “produced a very large effect on 
categorization judgements, with participants agreeing that the thing was a spider when 
its telos was changed […] and with participants agreeing that the thing was a bee when 
its telos was preserved” (p. 6). Given what we learned about diagnostic reasoning, pro-
ponents of SEH shouldn’t be surprised by these results. Participants knew that the ani-
mal underwent a scientific surgery, but they weren’t given any explicit information 
about whether the ‘scientific essence’ (e.g., bee DNA) was affected by the special sur-
gery. At the same time, they got information about which observable effect features of 
the essence changed. SEH predicts that participants make use of the observable infor-
mation to diagnose the presence or absence of the ‘scientific essence’. Since all fea-
tures that are normally caused by the scientific essence are absent, participants have 
no diagnostic evidence for the presence of the original scientific essence (e.g., bee 
DNA). Moreover, in contrast to Keil’s classical paradigm, R&N’s vignettes do not include 
an external causal intervention on tele; rather, the scientists in the story find that the 
animal itself generates the relevant telos-behavior “after running some tests”. This is 
crucial because the absence of a manipulated telos as part of the cover story means 
that the telos can be used to infer the scientific essence. Thus, SEH predicts that the 
evidence will be used to infer the corresponding scientific essence.4  
SEH predicts the outcomes of R&N’s other experiments in a way that is structurally 
analogous. Experiment 2 describes how a bee’s insides are replaced with a spider’s, 
 
4  This point is especially pertinent given the high diagnosticity of functional features (Lombrozo & 
Rehder, 2012). Interestingly, Lombrozo and Rehder (2012) carried out many experiments identifying 
why functional features (akin to telos) have high category diagnosticity. Unfortunately, R&N leave 
this work undiscussed. 
9 
varies the presence of the telos (i.e., making honey/spinning webs), and finds that par-
ticipants’ judgements greatly depend on whether the animal has the bee or spider te-
los. Again, SEH predicts these results: the telos provides important diagnostic evidence 
for the scientific essence, and should thus have a substantial impact on spider/bee 
judgements. R&N might claim that by replacing the ‘insides’ of the bee, they replaced 
any hypothetical scientific essence. However, according to SEH, the outward behavior 
simply provides evidence as to whether or not the scientific essence has changed. Thus, 
the telos might simply be taken as diagnostic evidence for the presence of the relevant 
scientific essence and that scientific essence does not strictly correspond to ‘insides’. 
In experiment 3, R&N find that category judgements of the animal are significantly 
influenced by telos preservation and change in an adoption task. They told participants 
that a bee was put into a spider cage right after it hatched from its egg, and manipu-
lated whether the telos changed or remained the same. Again, assuming we should 
use observable evidence in order to make diagnostic inferences about unobservable 
essences, it is not surprising that manipulating the observable evidence should have a 
noticeable effect on category judgements. But since other evidence still points, diag-
nostically, in the direction of a bee essence in the “telos changed” condition, the evi-
dence is less clear-cut. Correspondingly, the ratings in the “telos changed” condition 
were substantially more mixed than for the “telos preserved” condition, with an average 
rating for the “telos preserved” condition of 1.48, and 4.52 for the “telos changed con-
dition”, where 1 = it is definitely a bee, and 7 = it is definitely a spider. Similarly, the 
multimodal distribution of their data (cf. their figure 3, p. 10) suggests that the subjects 
were confused about what to do with the conflicting information. One of those modes 
was at the midpoint of the scale (4.0)—often used by subjects to express uncertainty. 
The reason for this is clear: the observable evidence favored the presence of a scientific 
bee essence in the “telos preserved” condition much more unambiguously, whereas 
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there was conflicting observable evidence in the “telos changed” condition (bee ap-
pearance and origin, but spider behavior), accounting for the higher variance in an-
swers and the lower average.  
In study 4, R&N found that telos guides category judgements in cross-fertilization 
scenarios. Just like in experiment 1, participants were first told that a (queen) bee has 
been superficially altered to look just like a spider. Depending on the condition, the 
animal was described as either having or not having changed its telos. Subsequently, 
depending on the condition, the animal’s egg was described as being fertilized by ei-
ther a spider or a bee. Participants were then asked to rate whether the thing that 
hatches from the egg will be a spider or a bee. In both conditions—i.e., when the result-
ing animal’s egg is fertilized by a bee and when it is fertilized by a spider—R&N find that 
the telos of the parent animal after the transformation significantly influences category 
predictions about the offspring. Since SEH predicts that we use observable evidence to 
make diagnostic inferences about scientific essences and category membership, it pre-
dicts these results. If observable behaviors serve as evidence of whether the scientific 
essence has been preserved after the surgical transformation, it will also serve as evi-
dence of what the offspring will be, given that this depends on the presence or absence 
of the scientific essence.  
Finally, R&N’s Study 5 combines study 1 with an explicit paradigm. After the cate-
gory judgements from study 1, participants were asked to rate whether “[the] thing after 
the changes no longer has the true essence of the original bee”. Their aim was to test 
whether essence judgements generate category judgements. Their mediation analysis 
showed that telos is a significant predictor for essence, essence is a significant predictor 
for category, but given the presence of essence, telos is not a significant predictor of 
category membership. Although there are independent concerns regarding R&N’s 
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methodology in study 5,5 taking the results at face value, the results of their mediation 
analysis are, again, completely predicted by SEH. That the relationship between telos 
and category membership disappears when we control for ‘essence’ is exactly what 
SEH would predict. We use telos as diagnostic evidence for the essence, which in turn 
lets us infer the presence or absence of category membership. Once we know what the 
essence is, however, knowledge of telos doesn’t add anything.6   
4. Conclusion 
The main problem of R&N’s study is that they failed to control for the possibility that the 
observed effects on the category judgements are due to inferences participants draw 
about a scientific essence. A proper test of the hypothesis that telos constitutes essence 
should consist in the manipulation of the superficial features only, the hypothesized 
scientific essence only, and the telos only, in order to assess which of these three ma-
nipulations has the biggest effect on categorization judgements, while the setup of the 
story makes clear that the respective other variables are kept constant. If TEH is correct, 
it should be far more likely that membership in a category survives change of, say, DNA 
than change of a given telos. Similarly, if telos remains stable, but the other observable 
features and the ‘scientific essence’ change, TEH predicts that category membership 
shouldn’t change either. So according to TEH, a bee that after a transformation has spi-
der DNA and looks like a spider, yet makes honey, should be judged a bee. In contrast, 
 
5  Most theoretical and empirical work on cognitive essentialism assumes that “essence” is a technical 
term that captures tacit conceptual structures. Thus, the methodology of study 5 seems 
independently questionable. 
6  Correspondingly, the arrow from telos to essence in figure 6 (Rose & Nichols, 2019, p. 14) is exactly 
the inferential path based on diagnostic reasoning.  
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a bee that gets transformed to look like a spider and spin webs, but has bee DNA, 
should be, contra SEH, judged a spider.  
 There are a number of broader issues with R&N’s proposal. Over many years, a 
number of cognitive scientists—notably, Woo-kyoung Ahn and her collaborators—have 
repeatedly found that effect features are substantially less important for category deci-
sions than cause features  (Ahn, 1998; Ahn, Gelman, Amsterlaw, Hohenstein, & Kalish, 
2000; Ahn, Kim, Lassaline, & Dennis, 2000; Sloman, Love, & Ahn, 1998; although see 
Rehder, 2017; Rehder & Kim, 2006 for qualification of the effect). The telos of an object 
is, as we have seen, the goal, end, or purpose of a thing.7 And purposes or goals corre-
spond to certain effects things have: if the purpose of my pen is to write, I expect my 
pen to have ‘writing’ as one of its effects. Thus, the pressing question arises how R&N’s 
results relate to the multitude of experiments that report that effect features are less 
important for categorization tasks. Why, for example, does Keil (1989) find that pre-
school children and adults think animals don’t change their category when they change 
functional telos-style features in transformation tasks? Not only does TEH claim that ef-
fect features are important for category decisions, they should be the most important 
ones, since they constitute the essence of a category. It is not clear how to uphold this 
hypothesis given the prima facie incompatible results by Ahn and collaborators (among 
others). 
Furthermore, the idea that essences can be thought of as ‘scientific essences’ has 
been a common assumption of psychological essentialism for several decades. Hun-
dreds of studies operate under precisely this conception of essentialism—varying 
 
7 See fn. 1. 
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genes, insides, atomic elements, and so on. Even if we took R&N’s results to unprob-
lematically favor TEH over SEH, going forward, in order for their theory of teleological 
essentialism to be minimally complete, they would need to explain (or explain away) 
the vast number of studies that speak in favor of a different hypothesis: that essences 
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